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A TECHNICAL LOOK AT THE EIGHTY PER CENT RULE AS
APPLIED TO EMPLOYEE SELECTION PROCEDURES
Jacob Van Bowen, Jr.*
C. Allen Riggins**
Introduction
In litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, sta-
tistical data has been referred to as "the only game in town."1 This
characterization only slightly overstates the importance of statisti-
cal data to prove or rebut a case of employment discrimination. In
the first decade of Title VII litigation, statistical analysis in the
courts was relatively uncomplicated, sometimes involving a mere
recital of percentage differences or lack thereof between minority
and majority classes. 2 In recent years, however, courts and Title VII
litigants have begun to take a more sophisticated view of the use of
statistics in Title VII litigation.3 Since statistics can be used both
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1. Daily Labor Report No. 188 (BNA), A-10 to A-11 (1976).
2. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) represents the major shift toward heavy
emphasis and reliance on statistical data in employment discrimination cases. Griggs focuses
on the actual impact of employment practices and emphasizes strict scrutiny of race, sex,
and ethnic ties in analyzing discrimination against employees of a given work force or general
population class. Griggs establishes that employer practices which have an adverse impact
on minorities and are not justified by business necessity constitute illegal discrimination
under Title VII. See also EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'g.,
United States v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (holding that statisti-
cal data which shows there is a substantial disparity between the race, sex, or ethnic composi-
tion of the general population and the race, sex, or ethnic composition of the employer's work
force is sufficient evidence to establish plaintiff's prima facie case); Erie Human Relations
Comm. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 471 F.2d
582 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); U.S. v. Carpenters and Joiners Assoc.,
Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied., 411 U.S. 939 (1973); U.S. v. St. Louis -
San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973); U.S.
v. Navajo Freight Lines, 525 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1975).
3. See Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). In Hazelwood,
various school officials were charged with engaging in a pattern or practice of teacher employ-
ment discrimination. In the years 1972-73 and 1973-74, it was shown that only 1.4 per cent
and 1.8 per cent of Hazelwood's teachers were Black compared to 15.4 per cent of the relevant
labor market area of St. Louis County and City. When this was viewed against the back-
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to support and to rebut allegations of discrimination, it is important
that any data offered be statistically and logically valid.
One test used to determine whether particular employee selection
procedure has an adverse impact on members of a protected class
is the so-called "eighty per cent rule" which provides:
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than
four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty per cent) of the rate for the group with the
highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement
agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater than four-
fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement
agencies as evidence of adverse impact.'
This rule was jointly issued on August 25, 1978, by four federal
agencies as part of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures.- This rule will be used by the Equal Employment Op-
portunities Commission,' by the Department of Justice in exercising
its responsibilities under federal law,' by the Civil Service Commis-
sion in application of Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, as it applies to federal agencies and in application of
ground of Hazelwood's teacher hiring procedures, it was held to constitute a prima facie case
of pattern or practice of racial discrimination by the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Court of Appeals' selection of labor markets for
comparison, but held that the court erred in disregarding the possibility that the prima facie
statistical proof might be rebutted at the trial court level by statistics dealing with Hazel-
wood's post-Title VII hiring practices. For example, the Court stated that comparison of the
number of Blacks hired compared to the total number of Black applicants might be relevant.
The Court reaffirmed its belief that statistics are an effective means of establishing a pattern
or practice of discrimination. However, citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
U.S., 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (a decision in which the Court considered the role of statistics in
pattern or practice suits and offered substantial guidance in the use thereof), the Court
strongly emphasized that: "Statistics . . . come in infinite variety .... Their usefulness
depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances." 433 U.S. at 312. For application
and analysis of both Teamsters and Hazelwood, see Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 442
F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
4. 43 Fed. Reg. 38297 (1978).
5. Prior to issuance of the uniform guidelines in 43 Fed. Reg. 38290 (1978), two sets of
guidelines existed along with an abundance of principles and orders.
6. It is significant that the EEOC has joined with the three other agencies in issuing the
above Guidelines. This is the first time the EEOC has put its stamp of approval on a set of
uniform guidelines. Prior documents and guidelines for employers issued separately by the
EEOC are published at 29 CFR 1607 (1977).
7. Previously, the Department of Justice had not formally set forth its policy in such
matters.
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Section 208(b)(1) of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act concern-
ing responsibilities toward state and local governments,8 and by the
Department of Labor in exercising its responsibilities under Execu-
tive Order 11246 as it applies to government contractors and sub-
contractors.9
Under the so-called eighty per cent rule, any selection procedure
which results in a selection rate for a protected class of less than
four-fifths of the selection rate for the majority class is regarded as
having an adverse impact on the members of the protected class.
Any selection procedure which has an adverse impact on a protected
class is considered to be evidence of discrimination under the Guide-
lines unless the procedure is validated"° or otherwise acceptable
under the regulations.
Since plaintiffs in Title VII litigation are permitted to establish
a "prima facie case" of discrimination by showing disparate treat-
ment, i.e., an adverse impact on a protected class in some aspect of
employment, a test which purports to definitively establish adverse
impact can be of major significance." Recently, parties to court
litigation have attempted to utilize this four-fifths or eighty per cent
test to prove or disprove discrimination.12 Thus, it is an appropriate
8. Former guidelines of the agency are published at 5 CFR 300.103(c) (1977).
9. Former guidelines of the agency are published at 41 CFR 60-3 (1977).
10. Validation is defined as a process whereby one determines whether the test at issue is
related to the job for which it is used. For further explanation of the concept, see Schlei &
Grossman, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (1976).
11. Once a Title VII plaintiff has submitted evidence establishing a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to defendant to rebut plaintiff's prima facie case by articulating some legiti-
mate, non-discriminatory reason for its treatment of plaintiff. The test for establishing a case
of prima facie employment discrimination consists of the following elements:
(i) that [an individual] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite
his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position re-
mained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complain-
ant's qualifications.
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
12. In two recent cases, Brown v. Schlesinger, Civil Action No. 74-0202-R (E.D. Va. 1977)
and United States v. Virginia State Police, Civil Action No. 76-0623-R (E.D. Va. 1978), the
United States Department of Justice has attempte to utilize the eighty per cent rule. In
Brown, the U.S. government was the defendant regarding employment practices at an agency
within the U.S. Department of Defense and was prepared by use of the eighty per cent rule
to prove the lack of discriminatory procedures for promotional selections and for selection of
clerical applicants. Brown was settled after the conclusion of plaintiff's case and without
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time to closely examine the rule's validity and applicability to Title
VII litigation. Courts must be very careful before automatically
adopting any rule which may be of worth only for the administrative
convenience it provides the governmental agencies adopting it.
It is the position of this article that the four-fifths or eighty per
cent rule is not statistically valid and should not be used because it
does not apply consistently to all employers. Even the Gu'idelines
recognize that the rule has limitations, providing:
Greater differences in selection rate may not constitute adverse
impact where the differences are based on small numbers and are not
statistically significant, or where special recruiting or other programs
cause the pool of minority or female candidates to be atypical of the
normal pool of applicants from that group.'3
The eighty per cent rule produces different results depending on
variables in the percentage of minorities in the relevant labor pool
and in the number of selections made. Neither courts nor govern-
mental agencies should utilize a rule which has different application
to different employers based on factors totally extraneous to issues
of discrimination. In place of the eighty per cent rule, this article
offers a consistent rule based on binomial distribution which makes
use of the standard deviation. A statistical approach similar to that
recommended has been accpeted by the Supreme Court as statisti-
cally valid in Hazelwood School District v. United States. 4 Because
the so-called eighty per cent rule does not treat all employers
equally, the rule should be rejected in favor of a more consistent rule
as proposed herein.
Application of the Eighty Per Cent Rule
The eighty per cent rule is one which is applied to hiring and/or
promotion processes in which the selection rate for a given class, i.e.
the minority class, is compared to the selection rate for another
judicial resolution of whether the eighty per cent rule is a valid statistical approach in
litigated cases.
13. 43 Fed. Reg. 38290.
14. 433 U.S. 299 (1977). See also Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee
Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TExAs L. REv. 1
(1977).
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class, i.e. the majority class. If the ratio of the selection rate for a
minority class to the selection rate for the majority class is less than
eighty per cent, there is automatically thought to be adverse im-
pact, and the employer is required, under the Guidelines, to vali-
date or discard the selection process. The burden of validation can
be costly as well as impossible in at least some cases.'" If the ratio
of the selection rates is not less than four-fifths, there is no valida-
tion requirement absent special circumstances.
There are several variables which can cause the rule to have an
unequal impact on employers. The two principal variables are the
total number of selections being made and the relative size of the
majority class. Another variable which must be considered is the
relative size of the qualified applicant pool.
Before we can describe the manner in which the eighty per cent
rule is not an equally stringent test for determining adverse impact,
it is necessary to adopt consistent definitions for two terms:
"statistically adequate employer" and "consistent rule."
Definition 1: A "statistically adequate employer" is one who uses the
same rule every time, which rule, if used repeatedly for a very large
number of selections, would produce the same proportion of minori-
ties in the job classification as that proportion of the minorities in the
pool from which selections are made.
Definition 2: A "consistent rule" is one which will have the same
likelihood of requiring validation (i.e., indicating adverse impact) for
every statistically adequate employer.
The question which must first be addressed is the level of consist-
ency in Definition 2 to be sought. For purposes of this article, the
figure of five per cent has been chosen as the maximum permissible
deviation. Statisticians use the five per cent figure most often and
refer to it as the ninety-five per cent level of significance.16 Similar
15. The tenure process in universities is but one example. Validation of the tenure process
would tend to establish that there is no consistent pattern of differential treatment for class
members, assuming that the factors considered are job related. Tenure decisions made by
differently selected committees in departments which place different emphasis on publica-
tion, research and teaching ability would have to be numerous to establish any pattern and
even more numerous to establish no consistent pattern for a small class.
16. 88 HAav. L. Rav. 1610 (1975). See also 89 HAuv. L. Rav. 387, 400 n. 58 (1976).
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charts and tables could be made for any value selected, but the
conclusions stated below would be the same.
One way to describe the manner in which the eighty per cent rule
is more harsh on the statistically adequate employer in some cases
than in others is to calculate the likelihood that such employers
would fail the test (eighty per cent rule) for adverse impact. In
Table I, N is used to denote the number of selections madeand "p"
denotes the majority proportion of the selection pool. The tabular
entry is the chance that the eighty per cent rule would indicate
adverse impact for an employer which is a statistically adequate
employer. The following appendices illustrate application of the
eighty per cent rule and provide guidelines which will hopefully
prove useful to attorneys analyzing Title VII problems.
EMPLOYEE SELECTION PROCEDURES
APPENDIX A
An examination of Table I clearly indicates that two statistically
adequate employers having different numbers of selections (N) or
having a different majority component of the selection pool also
have different chances of failing the test for adverse impact.
Example 1: Consider two statistically adequate employers. Suppose
that one employer makes 50 selections from a pool having 65% major-
ity class membership. Its chance of failing the test for adverse impact
is .23. On the other hand another employer making 25 selections from
a pool having 80% majority class membership has a .34 chance of
failing the test for adverse impact.
Conclusion 1: The Eighty Per Cent Rule is not equally stringent.
Note how the tabular entries increase as the number of selections
(N) is decreased. Also the entries increase if "p" (the majority pro-
portion of the pool) is increased.
Conclusion 2: The Eighty Per Cent Rule is a more stringent test
for those employers who make fewer selections, and it is harsher on
those who make selections from pools which have larger propor-
tions of majority class members.
Another way to examine this issue is to develop a rule which
would provide equal chances under varying conditions. If five per
cent is chosen as the level of permissible error (the chance of requir-
ing validation of the selection process when it should not be re-
quired), the following formula can be used to provide a consistent
rule.
R = A/(A + 1.645); where A = Np(1 - p) - 1.645 p, N is the
number of selections and "p" is the majority proportion of the pool.
The value of R obtained from the equation is the number which
should replace .80 in the Eighty Per Cent Rule in order to produce
a consistent rule.
1978]
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APPENDIX B
Chart I indicates various values of R under varying conditions so
that R can be read from the chart rather than calculated from the
formula.
Example 2: Consider an employer who has made 50 selections from
a pool composed of 75% majority class members.
A = 50(.75)(.25) - 1.645(.75)
A = 3.06 - 1.24
A = 1.82
R = 1.82/(1.82 + 1.645)
R = .524 or about .52.
We also note that R = .52 can be read from Chart I.
In Example 2 we found R = .52. This means that if the 52% rule
is used in place of the 80% Rule it would provide a 5% chance of
the statistically adequate employer failing the (52% Rule) test for
adverse impact. We also note that using the R obtained in this
manner would produce an equally stringent test under varying con-
ditions.
The assumptions which have been made for all of the calculations
in this work require that the number of members of each class of
the selection pool should be sufficiently large to fill all of the N
positions. In cases where there are only a few class members or
where the number of selections is small there is no (statistical) rule
appropriate for use.
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CHART I
.60 .65 .70 .75 .80 .85 .90
p: the proportion of majority in the selection pool
N: the number of selections made
R: the number which should replace .80 in the 80/ Rule
19781
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TABLE I
Probability of Requiring Validation for a Statistically Adequate Employer
$ Selections Population Proportions for the Majority Class
N .60 .65 .70 .75 .80 .85 .90
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND
LAW REVIEW
SUMMER 1978
EDITORIAL BOARD
TOM BONDURANT
Editor-in-Chief
RICHARD D. ALLRED
Executive Editor
ROBIN HOOVER ROBERTSON
Manuscripts Editor
EDWARD H. STARR, JR.
Articles Editor
JENNINGS G. RITTER I
Notes & Comments Editor
DEBORAH MORELAND RUSSELL
Notes & Comments Editor
ASSOCIATE EDITORS
STEVEN D. BENJAMIN
ROBERT E. DRAm
G. WINGATE GRANT
P. CHRISTOPHER GUEDRI
KEITH L. PHILLIPS
JACKSON M. BRUcE
PAUL CAMPSEN
JOHN M. CLAYTOR
NATHANIEL M. COLLIER m
WADE A. KIZER
Managing Editor
STAFF
HERMAN C. DANIEL
STEPHEN B. DEATON
THOMAS W. DIXON, JR.
ANDREW EDELSTEIN
KATHLEEN MEHFOUD
EDWARD P. ROBERTS
DOUG ROMAINE
EMILY TRAPNELL
STEVE UNGEMAN
FACULTY ADVISOR
RONALD J. BACIGAL
VOLUME 12 NUMBER 4

